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NOTES
THE (NON)PROBLEM OF A
LIMITED DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
John A. Meisey*
With respect to the people that are supporting me [in my election
bid], my position has been the same, which is: if the law's in your
favor, then I may find for you. If it's against you, then understand
that I may find against you, that's the way it is .... That's what I
stand for.
-West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent D. Benjamin1
INTRODUCTION
When West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent D. Benjamin
cast the deciding vote-twice-to overturn a $50 million award
against Massey Energy Co. (Massey),2 one hopes that the law was on
Massey's side. But, despite Justice Benjamin's assurances that it was,
3
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., English and
American Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2007. Special thanks to Professors Amy
Barrett and A.J. Bellia for their invaluable guidance during the writing of this Note,
and to the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their helpful comments and careful
editing.
1 William Kistner, Am. RadioWorks, Justice for Sale?, AM. RADIoWoRKS, http://
americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/judges/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2009)
(quoting Justice Brent D. Benjamin).
2 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 WL 4150960 (W. Va. Nov.
21, 2007), vacated and superseded on rehearing by 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008),
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008) (No. 08-22).
3 See Caperton, 2008 WL 918444 (Benjamin, J., concurring) ("Because the Major-
ity decision possesses such a deep strength of legal authority, I do not believe that the
Dissenting opinion in any way weakens the authority or substance of the Court's
decision.").
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several commentators are not so convinced. 4 Their contentions are
not with Justice Benjamin's legal reasoning (though that might also
be suspect 5), but rather with his participation in the case to begin
with. Indeed, Caperton presented Justice Benjamin and the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court with an unusual scenario: the CEO of appellant
Massey, Don Blankenship, was a vocal and generous supporter of Jus-
tice Benjamin's recent West Virginia Supreme Court election cam-
paign. 6 He was, one might say, Justice Benjamin's best supporter.
Blankenship donated over $3 million to Benjamin's 2004 election
bid-more than all other donors combined-while Massey's case was
preparing for appeal. 7
Understandably, Massy's opponents in Caperton sought to remove
Justice Benjamin from the case, but Benjamin refused, and he ulti-
mately voted with a three-to-two majority to overturn the verdict
against Blankenship and Massey.8 However, Massey's opponents
would have another chance at the case-as it turns out, Blankenship is
remarkably well connected in West Virginia, and that first decision was
fraught with potential biases. Shortly after the decision, photographs
surfaced of then-Chief Justice Elliott "Spike" Maynard (who also sided
with the three-Justice majority) vacationing with Blankenship in
Monte Carlo while the appeal was pending. 9 Blankenship's oppo-
nents requested, and were granted, a rehearing and Maynard
removed himself from the case.' 0 On the motion of Massey, a third
justice, Larry Starcher, also sat out the second case.1 In his outrage
over the first decision (in which he was half of the two-Justice minor-
ity), Justice Starcher had proven to not be Blankenship's biggest sup-
porter. Justice Starcher had in fact vocally berated Blankenship,
calling him, among other things, "stupid, evil and a clown."1 2 ButJus-
4 See, e.g., Editorial, Mining Shows Sooty Side of Big-Money Judicial Elections, USA
TODAY, Mar. 3, 2009, at 10A (arguing thatJustice Benjamin's participation in the case
"cannot be trusted"); Editorial, Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at A28 [here-
inafter Tainted Justice] (characterizing Justice Benjamin's vote in the case as the result
of "a bald attempt by the chief executive of Massey Energy to purchase a favorable
decision").
5 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-11, Caperton, No. 08-22 (U.S. Nov. 14,
2008), 2008 WL 2676568 [hereinafter Certiorari Petition].
6 See Kistner, supra note 1.
7 Certiorari Petition, supra note 5, at 2.
8 Id.
9 See id. at 11.
10 Id. at 2.
11 Id. at 13.
12 Adam Liptak, US. Supreme Court Is Asked to Fix Troubled West Virginia Justice Sys-
tem, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A41.
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tice Benjamin did not follow the lead of his colleagues and remained
on the case-as acting Chief Justice-and he once again cast the
deciding vote for a three-to-two majority in Massey's favor.13
The Massey saga is, in many senses, alarming, and the public has
taken notice. News outlets across the country have followed the story,
and editorials from the Charleston Gazette1 4 to the New York Times1 5
have criticized the West Virginia justices' behavior. ChiefJustice May-
nard has been called "unworthy of the bench,' 1 6 Justice Benjamin has
been attacked for a lack of ethics,1 7 and the West Virginia Supreme
Court as a whole has been described as a "supreme mess."18 Maynard
has already lost his reelection bid, 19 and West Virginia lawmakers are
reconsidering how the State selects its justices in the first place. 20
Famed novelist John Grisham has even used the episode to promote
his newest legal thriller. 21 And now, the Supreme Court of the United
States has heard the case, and will consider whether Justice Benja-
min's participation was unconstitutional. 22
But, perhaps most troubling, the Massey scandal is not as rare as
it might seem. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States
has intermittently been scandalized by similar judicial ethics contro-
versies. In the 1940s, Justice Hugo Black's participation in a case2 3
tried by his former law partner (from twenty years earlier) drew harsh
13 Certiorari Petition, supra note 5, at 3.
14 Editorial, Supreme Mess, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Nov. 19, 2008, at 4A [hereinaf-
ter Supreme Mess].
15 See Tainted Justice, supra note 4.
16 Opinion, The "Spike" Maynard Case:Justice Undermined, Prrr. TRIB.-REv.,Jan. 21,
2008, at A7.
17 See Editorial, Supreme Court, CHARLESTON GAzETTE, Oct. 8, 2008, at 4A.
18 See Supreme Mess, supra note 14.
19 See Liptak, supra note 12.
20 See Lawrence Messina, W Va. Lawmakers Eye New Ways to Pick Judges, CHARLES-
TON GAZETTE, Sept. 8, 2008, at 1A.
21 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case with the Feel of a Best Seller,
USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2009, at Al (describing Grisham's promotion of his book on
NBC's Today Show). Grisham's novel, The Appeal, which presents "an expos6 of how
highly organized special-interest groups, loaded with cash, can manipulate the judi-
cial system," was released in early 2008. See Carol Memmett, Grisham's 'Appeal' Rules
Harshly on Bought Elections, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
life/books/reviews/2008-01-28-grisham-appealN.htm.
22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in November 2008, see Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008) (No. 08-22) (granting certiorari), and oral
argument was held in early March 2009, see Transcript of Oral Argument, Caperton,
No. 08-22 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2009).
23 Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161
(1945).
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criticism from his colleague Justice Robert Jackson, and "brought the
subject of judicial disqualification sharply into the focus of public and
professional attention. '24 In 1972, then-Justice William H. Rehnquist
garnered similar criticism for his participation in a case 25 about a fed-
eral surveillance program that the government had initiated while
Rehnquist worked in the U.S. Department of Justice. 26 Most recently,
in 2004, Justice Antonin Scalia drew a veritable firestorm of criticism
for sitting in a case 27 against Vice President Dick Cheney, with whom
Justice Scalia had recently gone duck hunting. 28
As the public backlash suggests, these occasional scandals raise an
unsettling question: Does U.S. law, as currently practiced, fail to pro-
tect litigants from improper participation by biased judges? A recent
wave of scholarship suggests that the answer to this question is yes.
Some reformers have addressed lawmakers, proposing specific correc-
tions for America's recusal statutes. Nearly every jurisdiction in the
United States has created some measure of judicial disqualification
(or recusal) 29 law to control the cases that its judges may hear-by
forcing them to step down in certain situations. But, if the scholarship
examining the scope of these laws is any indication, changes might be
necessary. Moreover, others have suggested that the failure to remove
certain judges is more than an issue for our congressmen. Indeed,
underlying all the criticisms, and behind every public outcry, is the
ultimate question of whether the participation of these various judges
deprives litigants of their constitutional right to due process of law.
This is the question that the Supreme Court will squarely address in
the Caperton appeal, and it is the question that this Note evaluates.
Ultimately, however troubling these cases seem, due process is
likely not the proper avenue for recusal reform. As established histor-
ically and as understood by the Supreme Court, due process provides
only a basic floor for recusal standards, above which Congress and the
States are left to fill in recusal procedures as they see fit. While this
approach potentially leaves several questionable situations unpro-
24 John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 605 (1947).
25 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
26 See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L.
REV. 589, 591-96 (1987) (describing Justice Rehnquist's decision and its reception).
27 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
28 See Editorial, Judicial Ethics Under Review, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A28
(describing "widespread outrage" when justice Scalia refused to step down).
29 Though, technically, "disqualification" describes the statutorily or constitution-
ally mandated removal of ajudge (typically on motion by one of the parties), whereas
"recusal" refers to ajudge's voluntary decision to step down from a case, this Note will
follow the general practice of modem scholarship, which uses the two terms inter-
changeably. See RIcHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION § 1.1 (2d ed. 2007).
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tected constitutionally-as the various above scandals illustrate-fears
over limited recusal rights are in large part overblown. Indeed, the
practical effects, potential benefits, and structural implications of a
limited due process right to recusal demonstrate that such a right
should not trouble the American public. It is simply not the case that
due process is the only solution to recusal controversy, and the conse-
quences of a robust due process right suggest that it is indeed an
answer that we should hesitate to embrace. If anything, the freedom
that a limited right offers to lawmakers, and its restraint from compre-
hensively "answering" what are exceedingly difficult policy choices,
should appeal to the nation's court observers.
In evaluating these claims, this Note proceeds in four parts. Part
I reviews the history and development of U.S. recusal law; Part II dis-
cusses the Supreme Court's approach to recusal law and describes crit-
icisms of the Court's current jurisprudence; Part III examines
specifically what due process requires of recusal; and Part IV evaluates
the consequences of a limited due process right, considering its practi-
cal effects, its potential benefits, and its structural implications for our
federal system of government.
I. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN U.S. LAw
Judicial disqualification procedures existed long before the enact-
ment of our Constitution and its Due Process Clauses,30 and recusal
has always been a part of U.S. law. Like U.S. law in general, our
recusal procedures grew out of English common law practice, and
over time they have steadily grown and developed. Before turning to
the constitutional implications of judicial disqualification, it is useful
to briefly outline this progression of U.S. judicial disqualification law,
and to highlight both its current practice and its growing critics.
A. Common Law Origins
Rooted in the ancient maxim that judges should stand apart from
the matter before them, the concept of judicial disqualification "is as
old as the history of courts.131 Both early Jewish law and the Roman
Code of Justinian made provisions for the removal of judges on the
suspicion of bias,3 2 and renowned jurist Henry de Bracton sought to
30 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. "); id. amend. XIV (prohibiting states from
doing the same).
31 FLAuMM, supra note 29, § 1.2, at 5.
32 See id. The Jewish Code of Maimonides declares that a judge is not to partici-
pate in any case wherein he has a personal relationship with a party, whether it be
2009] I 8o 3
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infuse early English common law with similarly broad recusal stan-
dards.33 But, despite his efforts, at the time of the United States'
founding, common law recusal practice was, to quote Professor John
Frank, "simple in the extreme": a judge was disqualified for his direct
financial interest in the case, and for nothing else. 34 Sir William
Blackstone directly confronted and rejected the proposition that
judges be disqualified merely for suspected bias. 35 Because ajudge "is
already sworn to administer impartial justice," and because judicial
authority "greatly depends upon that presumption and idea," Black-
stone placed a heavy burden upon those seeking to impugn a judge's
neutrality.3 6 These narrow disqualification grounds were further
restricted by the common law "rule of necessity," which required that
a judge, even with a direct pecuniary interest, hear a case if no ade-
quate substitute was available. 37 In short, early common law tradition
required judges to step down in only the narrowest of instances.
B. Disqualification in Contemporary U.S. Law
United States law grew out of this common law tradition; how-
ever, as U.S. court systems developed, so did our recusal practices.
Over time, both federal and state courts significantly broadened their
disqualification standards beyond the rigid simplicity of Blackstone's
time.38 Throughout the United States' early independence, the nar-
row recusal standards of the common law prevailed, 39 but near the
turn of the nineteenth century, both federal and state governments
began attempts to restrain judicial bias through statutory control. The
Second Congress led the way, enacting the first federal judicial dis-
friendship or dislike, and the Code ofiustinian permitted a party to remove a judge
that he suspected of bias. See id.
33 See id. at 5-6.
34 Frank, supra note 24, at 609-12.
35 See id. at 610 & n.15 ("[I]t is held that judges and justices cannot be chal-
lenged. For the law will not suppose the possibility of bias or favor in a judge . . .
(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361)).
36 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *361. Indeed, this presumption of judicial
neutrality was so strong that early English courts did not require judges to step down
even from cases involving their immediate family members (though English jurors
were disqualified in analogous situations). See FLAMM, supra note 29, § 1.2, at 6.
37 See Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the Problem of
Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 381, 383 (1990); see also FLAMM, supra note 29, § 20.1
(discussing the rule of necessity).
38 See Frank, supra note 24, at 612; see also FLAMM, supa note 29, § 1.4 (describing
an American "evolution" of thinking about judicial disqualification).
39 See FLAMM, supra note 29, § 1.4, at 8 ("[Flor years following independence
American law ... admitted of very few grounds for seekingjudicial disqualification.").
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qualification statute in 1792.40 Though this original statute provided
only limited expansion of the common law,41 it was subsequently
amended several times, enlarging the disqualification grounds nearly
every time.42 Though too diverse to detail here, state governments
often followed suit and enacted similar recusal laws of their own.
43
Today, federal recusal law is governed principally by 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, the modern descendant of the 1792 recusal statute. 44 Broken
into two parts-the first providing general grounds for recusal and
the second specific-§ 455 essentially adds onto the common law
"pecuniary interest" standard additional bias-based restrictions on a
judge's ability to sit on a case.45 First, § 455 (a) provides a waivable
catch-all standard, which requires a federal 'justice, judge, or magis-
40 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278, 278-79 (amended 1911); see also
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at
2 (2002), available at http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/tjc/recusal.pdf (providing
historical information about the modern recusal statute).
41 The 1792 statute allowed for disqualification only if the judge was "concerned
in interest" or "ha[d] been of counsel for either party." § 11, 1 Star. at 278-79.
42 FLAMM, supra note 29, § 1.4, at 9 & n.8. Examples of these expansions include
prohibiting ajudge from hearing appeal of a case he tried, see Act of Mar. 8, 1891, ch.
517, § 3, 26 Star. 826, 827 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006)), and allowing
disqualification for bias upon a party's sufficient affidavit, see Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch.
231, § 22, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006)).
43 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Recusal Standards for Judges in Pennsylvania: Cause
for Concern, 36 VILL. L. REv. 713, 719 n.21 (1991) (describing Pennsylvania's judicial
recusal laws passed in 1816 and 1825). A number of states included these recusal
standards directly in their respective constitutions. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1831, art.
VI, § 8 (providing for replacement of an "interested" chancellor on the chancery
court by the chief justice of the superior court); Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 15
(noting the inability ofjudges to sit in cases on account of their interest in the cause,
relationship to the parties, or prior involvement with the case in a lower court); MD.
CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 5 (prohibiting ajudge from sitting in any case "wherein he
may be interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with him by affin-
ity or consanguinity within such degrees as may be prescribed by law, or when he shall
have been counsel in said case"). However, it is worth noting that not all states fol-
lowed behind the lead of the federal government, as Connecticut, for instance, has
had its own disqualification statute since 1672. See FLAMM, supra note 29, § 28.8, at
838.
44 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 2 (describ-
ing the statute). There are, however, two other federal judicial disqualification stat-
utes, which, for the purposes of this Note, it is unnecessary to discuss in detail.
Section 144 of Title 28 governs district court recusals triggered by a party's affidavit
showing actual bias, and is, for the most part, overlapped by § 455. See id. at 1. Often
overlooked, 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006) essentially codifies the 1891 amendment to the
federal recusal statute, preventing a judge from hearing appeal of a case or issue that
he previously tried. See id.
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 455.
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trate" to remove himself from any case in which "his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." 46 Section 455(b), on the other
hand, has a much narrower focus-it identifies particular, unwaivable
situations in which perceived conflicts of interest require a judge to
step down from a case, regardless of his (or anyone else's) assessment
of the matter.47 In practice, the two provisions work together to inject
federal recusal with some concrete standards beyond the historical
interest-only practice.
Similar to the federal standards, most states have enacted their
own recusal statutes,48 and nearly all states have some express measure
of local recusal law. 49 In all jurisdictions, judges are subject to
removal for at least good cause, 50 and in a "substantial minority" of
states, litigants may also seek peremptory disqualification, requiring
the automatic removal of a judge even without a showing of cause.5 1
In almost all instances, these provisions provide an affirmative layer of
disqualification standards above that which the Constitution guaran-
tees. 52 In addition, in all U.S. court systems, the American Bar Associ-
ation's (ABA) Model Judicial Code of Conduct provides explicit
recusal provisions (similar in many ways to federal standards) that
hold judges also to strict professional ethics standards for recusal. 53
46 Id. § 455(a). Since 1974, the broad language of § 455(a) has been examined
objectively: the provision asks what a reasonable person would think about a judge's
impartiality in a given situation. See Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds forJudicial
Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1048 (1993). The current
§ 455(a) replaced what had been a longstanding practice of assessing impartiality sub-
jectively, where the relevant inquiry was whether the judge "in his opinion" believed his
participation to be improper. See FED. JUDIclAL CTR., supra note 40, at 5.
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), (e); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 860 n.8 (1988) ("[Section] 455(b) (4) requires disqualification ... whether
or not the interest actually creates an appearance of impropriety .... Section 455(b)
is therefore a somewhat stricter provision and thus is not simply redundant with the
broader coverage of §455(a) .... ). These unwaivable circumstances include, among
other things, when a judge maintains a "personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party," has previously "served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy," or has a "third
degree" relative who is actively participating in the case. See § 455(b).
48 See F[AMM, supra note 29, § 2.6.
49 See id. § 26.1.
50 See id. § 28.
51 Id. § 27.1
52 Id. § 2.5.2, at 34-35.
53 See id. § 2.8. The level of enforcement behind these provisions varies across
jurisdictions, but in some states the Code carries the full force of law. See id.
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C. Criticisms of Modern Practice
Despite the growth of statutory recusal law, judicial disqualifica-
tion standards do not always compel ajudge to remove himself from a
contentious case. Accordingly, a robust scholarly debate has emerged,
and a number of writers have detailed various ills of current recusal
law. Indeed, statutory recusal reform is frequently a live and active
issue for our nation's lawmakers, and over time, recusal law has stead-
ily grown in direct response to such criticisms. 54 Federal disqualifica-
tion law has garnered particular attention-especially through a host
of critiques stemming from the recent Supreme Court recusal contro-
versies 55-and, for brevity, these federal criticisms will be the focus
here.
56
The arguments for reform statutory are myriad, and they
approach the issue from different angles, but they all operate from
the same premise: the federal disqualification statute is inadequate,
inconsistent, and in need of change. Most straightforward, many
reformers seek the addition of specific substantive provisions to com-
pel disqualification in presently unaccounted for situations. 57 Others
argue, more broadly, that the procedures already in place need fur-
ther clarification in order to be effective.58 In this regard, at least one
54 Prevailing discontent has often led to growth in both the federal recusal stat-
utes, see id. § 23.1, and state recusal laws, see generally id. §§ 27-28 (detailing state
recusal laws).
55 For example, searches in the Westlaw "JLR" database reveal thatJustice Scalia's
decision to sit in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), has garnered attention
in more than eighty articles, notes, and comments in law journals at the time of writ-
ing in Fall of 2008.
56 There are, of course, a wide array of criticisms of state recusal laws that are also
worthy of engagement, but, for the purposes of this Note, discussion of federal recusal
law is sufficient to demonstrate the thrust of scholarship in this area. For an overview
of various issues within state recusal standards, see, for example, Kilimnik, supra note
43 (critiquing Pennsylvania recusal law); Charles Malarkey, Note, Judicial Disqualifica-
tion: Is Sexual Orientation Cause in California?, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 695 (1990) (surveying
California recusal law); Jennifer Simpson, Comment, Automatic Judicial Disqualification
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a): A Necessary Lauryering Tool or Potential Nuclear Weapon ?,
43 IDAHo L. REV. 239 (2006) (proposing changes for Idaho recusal law). See also
FLAMM, supra note 29, §§ 27-28 (detailing the historical progression, and criticisms,
of each state's recusal law).
57 See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 46, at 1076-81 (advocating for an express
recusal requirement in cases litigated by ajudge's former law clerk);Jeremy M. Miller,
Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not
Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REv. 575, 595-96 (2006) (criticizing the lack of a statutory
bright-line rule on "friendship").
58 See, e.g., Ziona Hochbaum, Note, Taking Stock: The Need to Amend 28 US.C.
§ 455 to Achieve Clarity and Sensibility in Disqualification Rules for Judges' Financial Hold-
2009 1 180 7
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reformer simply longs for more eloquent drafters. 59 Still others high-
light a deeper problem: the federal recusal process itself may require
a stronger procedural backbone. 60 Regardless of the discrete situa-
tions that statutorily warrant disqualification, on this view, the proce-
dural inadequacies of current federal recusal law threaten to undercut
the recusal system as a whole.61 For instance, the process of allowing
judges to individually assess, for themselves, the propriety of sitting on
a case may essentially render moot the discussion of what situations
ought to require recusal.62 Indeed, in the eyes of at least one critic,
this current procedure may be so inadequate as to leave federal
recusal law a "mere caricature [] ."63 While it is outside the scope of
this Note to actively engage this debate, it is important to recognize
ings, 71 FORD-AM L. REV. 1669 (2003) (calling for clarification of the financial interest
standards for disqualification); Matthew E. Kaplan, Comment, Judicial Process at Risk:
Scales ofJustice Unequal Under Present Federal Judicial Disqualification Statutes, 8 U. MtAMI
Bus. L. REV. 273, 296-97 (2000) (suggesting changing the ambiguous language of
§ 455 to restrict judges' discretion and temper "creative interpretation" of its provi-
sions); R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance &
Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1829 (2005)
(arguing that codifying the vagaries of Supreme Court recusal practices will ensure
that the Court does not "reinvent[ ] the recusal process as new cases arise"). Profes-
sor Leslie Abramson has similarly critiqued the uncertainty surrounding the ABA's
ethical standards for discrimination based on the "appearance" of bias. See Leslie W.
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a judge's Impartiality "Might Reasona-
bly Be Questioned, " 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000).
59 See Miller, supra note 57, at 595 ("In passing, it is also interesting to note, with
requisite respect, that [the federal recusal statute] is sloppily drafted.").
60 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts,
87 IOWA L. REv. 1213, 1251-56 (2002) [hereinafter Bassett, Appellate Courts] (propos-
ing a peremptory challenge procedure for judicial disqualifications); Debra Lyn Bas-
sett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 693-97 (2005) (urging
Supreme CourtJustices to facilitate effective recusal motions by voluntarily disclosing
"statements of interest" in borderline cases); Amanda Frost, Keeping up Appearances: A
Process-Oriented Approach toJudicial Recusa, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 531, 582-90 (2005) (pro-
posing several procedural changes to control recusal decisions); Stempel, supra note
26, at 643-45 (proposing an amendment to § 455, to establish neutral review of
recusal motions by the full Supreme Court, absent the challenged justice).
61 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 60, at 552 ("[B]etter procedures, rather than stricter
substantive standards, are needed to govern the [recusal] law's application .... What
matters is that procedures be developed so that disqualification laws fulfill their
goal .... ").
62 The idea is that, assessing recusal for themselves, individual judges "have an
incentive to narrowly construe" congressionally established recusal laws, "inevitably
narrow[ing] [these laws] . . . to the point where they no longer serve the intended
purpose." Id. at 551.
63 Stempel, supra note 26, at 642-43.
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these general concerns and, moreover, the consistent attention to stat-
utory recusal reform which they reflect.
64
II. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
Compared to the wide growth of statutory recusal standards, as a
constitutional matter, the grounds for judicial disqualification remain
much narrower. It is well settled that due process requires an inde-
pendent and impartial adjudicator, 65 but, as expressed by the
Supreme Court, the recusal implications of that founding premise are
rather limited. To date, the Supreme Court has only seldom
extended the due process requirements of recusal beyond the com-
mon law pecuniary interest standard. Like the limits of current
recusal statutes, the narrow constitutional requirements ofjudicial dis-
qualification have come under scholarly fire, and, as expressed by
some commentators, the implications of this limited standard might
indeed be cause for serious concern.
A. The Court's Disqualification Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has examined the constitutional require-
ments of judicial disqualification somewhat infrequently, and the
Court has primarily extrapolated its recusal jurisprudence from a case
decided in the 1920s: Tumey v. Ohio.66 In Tumey, the Court invali-
dated a state procedure that compensated judges for delivering con-
victions, but not acquittals, in petty crime cases.6 7 In line with
common law practices, the Court explained:
[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his
liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which
has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case.
68
64 For in depth discussion of the historical progression, modem practice, and
lingering criticisms of both federal and state recusal laws, see FLAMM, supra note 29,
§§ 23, 27-28.
65 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual
bias in the trial of cases.").
66 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
67 Id. at 535.
68 Id. at 523. If the historical roots of this holding are not clear enough on its
face, the Court relied directly upon English common law cases in reaching its deci-
sion. See id. at 524-26.
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While the Court decided Tumey directly on this common law ground,
its opinion also included some intriguingly further-reaching dicta, 69
upon which the Court would expand its approach in In re Murchison.70
In Murchison, the Court held that a judge who had served as a "one-
man grand jury" in the prosecution of a criminal defendant could not
then preside over the defendant's trial.71 Because in such a situation
the judge likely maintains the "zeal of a prosecutor," the Court rea-
soned that he "cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinter-
ested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused." 72 Quoting
Tumey's dicta, the Court reasoned that such a situation "might lead
[the judge] not to hold the balance [between the parties] nice, clear
and true," and therefore concluded that his participation was uncon-
stitutional. 73 Further, the Court clarified that a definitive showing of
actual bias is not necessary to trigger due process concerns74-pre-
sumably because of the great difficulty inherent in sorting out when a
judge, despite his contentions to the contrary, is indeed biased.
Though Murchison thus affirmed that the Constitution, at times,
requires recusal when the common law did not, the implications of its
holding are nevertheless limited. Indeed, the Court carefully distin-
guished its decision from several analogous situations. First, the Court
noted that, unlike the typical grand juror who participates among a
group of many, a one-man grand jury cannot preside over his own
charges, because he necessarily "prefers" them. 75 Thus, if the charg-
ing decision were spread among several participants, the Court's rule
would not necessarily require a former grand juror to step down from
the case. Further, the Court's rule does not even bar a judge from
adjudicating a contempt charge that was committed in his immediate
presence at trial. Because the judge in such a scenario has not "sum-
69 Despite the holding's common law basis, in reaching its decision in Tumey, the
Court also opined:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant,
or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
Id. at 532.
70 349 U.S. 133.
71 Id. at 133, 139. Under Michigan law, the judge in Murchison was permitted to
act as a "one-man grand jury" and to compel witnesses to testify about charges in
limine, before proceeding with the trial. See id. at 133-34.
72 Id. at 137.
73 Id. at 136 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).
74 See id. ("[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case ... .
75 Id. at 137.
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marily tried" the defendant, his participation would not rise to the
same level of zealous interest as that in Murchison.76 It would "not
[be] impossible" for such ajudge to free himself of any predetermina-
tions, and his participation is therefore not unconstitutional. 7 7 Thus,
while there were no finances to consider, the Court ultimately ruled
against the judge in Murchison because he held a manifestly direct
interest in the case.
78
In Ward v. Village of Monroeville,79 the Court again incrementally
expanded its common law approach. There, the Court ruled that a
village mayor could not fairly adjudicate a trial wherein a conviction
would result in direct payment of fines to his village.8 0 Citing Tumey's
direct pecuniary interest holding, 81 the Court extended "the limits of
that principle" and found that the mayor's participation was unconsti-
tutional because the revenue produced by the court provided a "'sub-
stantial portion of [his] municipality's funds.' '"82 In doing so, the
Court carefully distinguished its holding from another case,8 3 in
which the mayor of Xenia, Ohio was permitted to exercise similar
judicial functions. Noting the Xenia mayor's comparatively limited
executive functions, the Court reasoned that, unlike in Ward, there
"the financial policy of the city was too remote to warrant a presump-
tion of bias" against him.8 4 Thus, while expanding constitutional dis-
qualification standards, in Ward the Court once again proceeded
cautiously, in effect merely elaborating how "direct" a financial inter-
est must be.
8 5
76 Id. at 137-38.
77 Id.
78 And indeed one might reasonably argue, as Justices Reed and Minton did in
dissent, that the prosecutorial interest of the judge in Murchison was not direct or
substantial enough to warrant disqualification, but disagreement over the Court's
conclusion does not change the reasoning upon which it relied. See id. at 142 (Reed
& Minton, JJ., dissenting) ("It is one thing to hold that a judge has too great an
interest in a case ... when his compensation is determined by the result he reaches.
It is quite another thing to disqualify a state judge as having too great an interest...
when his sole interest.., is the maintenance of order and decorum in the investiga-
tion of crime ....").
79 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
80 Id. at 61-62.
81 See id. at 60.
82 Id. at 59 (quoting Vill. of Monroeville v. Ward, 271 N.E.2d 757, 761 (1971)).
83 Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928).
84 See Ward, 409 U.S. at 60-61. In Dugan, the Mayor at issue still exercised both
legislative and executive powers, but unlike the mayor in Ward, he shared those pow-
ers with a commission of four other people. See id.
85 But see id. at 62 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision
strayed too far from the direct pecuniary interest standard).
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Even if Murchison and Ward arguably opened the door to a broad
realm of constitutional judicial disqualifications, that door may have
been shut by the Court's subsequent opinions. In Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Lavoie,8 6 the Court once again relied upon common law recusal
standards to vacate a judgment by the Supreme Court of Alabama,
which upheld an award for a bad faith insurance claim.8 7 Because
one of the Alabama justices personally had two similar claims pending
in Alabama courts (whose merits would turn directly upon whatever
rule was announced in Aetna), the Court ruled that he improperly
held a direct pecuniary interest in the matter.88 In reaffirming that
due process incorporates the common law recusal prohibitions, the
Court also expressly limited the extent of its holding and its prior
decisions. The Court rejected the notion that its ruling rested broadly
on the Alabama justice's "personal bias" against insurance companies,
and instead clarified that only in the "most extreme of cases would
disqualification [for personal bias] be constitutionally required. 89
The Court reiterated these limits with even greater clarity in Bracy
v. Gramley.90 There, the Court held that a judge who accepts bribes
from some criminal defendants at least arguably maintains an uncon-
stitutional interest against other defendants (to protect his image as
tough on crime, while keeping his bribes in place). 91 Nevertheless,
the Court insisted that its approach to recusal should be construed
narrowly:
[M]ost questions concerning ajudge's qualifications to hear a case
are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uni-
form standard. Instead these questions are, in most cases, answered
by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench
and bar.
92
In sum, despite a gradual progression over the twentieth century,
constitutional recusal requirements, as established by the Supreme
Court, remain rarely defined and rather narrow.
86 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
87 Id. at 828-29.
88 See id. at 824-25.
89 Id. at 820-21.
90 520 U.S. 899 (1997).
91 Id. at 909.
92 Id. at 904 (citation omitted).
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B. Searching for an Expanded Right
Like America's disqualification statutes, the Court's limited
recusaljurisprudence has come under attack, and some claim that the
Constitution requires more of ourjudges. 93 As Professors Martin Red-
ish and Lawrence Marshall explain, the notion is simple: "IT] he par-
ticipation of an independent adjudicator is at least one element of
[the due process] floor."94 However, what follows from that unassum-
ing foundation is critical: "[W] ithout prophylactic protection of adju-
dicatory independence [through recusal], the Constitution's majestic
guarantee of due process of law may in reality be no more than a
deceptive fa4ade. ''95 Indeed, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect, at a minimum, the procedural
rights to notice and a meaningful hearing, 96 and strict adherence to
these values mandates that litigants argue before an independent and
impartial adjudicator. 97 With so much at stake, the argument goes, we
should not readily defer to state and federal legislatures as to what
procedures their judges must afford litigants. 98
93 Indeed in many ways, it is this basic concern over due process that drives the
statutory criticisms themselves. See, e.g., Bassett, Appellate Courts, supra note 60, at 1256
(advocating reform of § 455, because "[t]he current federal recusal and disqualifica-
tion provisions simply do not accord adequate due process protections").
94 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455, 457 (1986).
95 Id. at 505. More controversially, Redish and Marshall also argue that assurance
of an impartial adjudicator is perhaps the only necessary procedural due process
requirement. See id. at 476 ("[T]he values of due process might arguably be safe-
guarded absent [other] procedural protections. None of the core values of due pro-
cess, however, can be fulfilled without the participation of an independent
adjudicator.").
96 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) ("[T]he central meaning of pro-
cedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are enti-
tled to be heard; and ... they must first be notified.' It is equally fundamental that
the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted ... in a meaning-
ful manner."' (citations omitted) (quoting first Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S.C. (1 Wall.)
223, 233 (1864), then Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). However,
more will be said on this below. See infra Part III.
97 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("[Due process] requires an
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.").
98 Cf Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the
Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. Rv. 563, 574 (2004) (noting that
while the Supreme Court has mostly left recusal protections to the states, due process
nevertheless requires disqualification in certain situations). Further, while the
Supreme Court has taken a broadly deferential approach to judicial disqualification
standards, the first Supreme Court decision to construe the Due Process Clause
rejected a purely positivist account of due process (which would afford litigants only
what processes the legislature has demanded). See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
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Despite the relative limits of the Court's recusal holdings, its occa-
sionally sweeping languageP9 may lend itself to a more expansive
recusal right. Indeed, some commentators insist that the broad phras-
ing of Tumey's dicta in fact requires us to flesh out a robust right.10 0
That the Court has, in some instances, extended judicial disqualifica-
tion beyond a direct financial interest perhaps supports this notion.
Indeed, Michelle Friedland argues that the Murchison decision reflects
an underlying principle that due process prevents a judge who has
"publicly drawn a conclusion about a case and what its outcome
should be" from ultimately judging the merits of that case. 0 1 Fried-
land therefore argues for substantive additions to our constitutional
recusal standards-specifically that a judge may not sit in a case
wherein his previous public statements express a predetermined con-
clusion about the matter before him, 10 2 display "extreme animosity"
against one of the litigants, 0 3 or demonstrate an intent to violate the
law at issue in the case.
10 4
The appellants in Caperton argue, more broadly, that Murchison
requires the removal of any judge even "tainted" by the probability or
appearance of bias. 10 5 Noting the Court's "endeavor" to prevent proba-
ble adjudicatory bias-rather than to fruitlessly search out a judge's
admission of actual bias-the appellants take Tumey's dicta at its face
value and argue that any probable temptation of bias renders a
judge's participation unconstitutional.1 0 6 Professors Redish and Mar-
shall illustrate this point with an argument that impresses with its sim-
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856) ("It is manifest that it was not
left to the legislative power to enact any process which might be devised."); see also
Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 457-58 (noting the Court's rejection of the posi-
tivist view).
99 See supra note 69.
100 See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 98, at 578 (arguing that Tumey's discussion of a
judge's inability to "hold the balance, nice, clear and true" between the parties
implies that a judge should be disqualified based on his public statements about the
merits of a case); Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 500-02 (arguing that due pro-
cess requires the removal of any judge with an identifiable bias).
101 Friedland, supra note 98, at 579.
102 Id. at 579-84.
103 Id. at 585-91.
104 Id. at 591-98. Such situations, Friedland contends, threaten "fundamental
concept[s] in American justice," specifically the notions that guilt must be proven at
trial, that a judge is to apply law evenhandedly, and that decisions are grounded in
the law. Id. at 580, 585, 591.
105 Brief for Petitioners at 19, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S.
Dec. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 5433361.
106 See id. at 19, 21-23; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 5
(urging the Court to adopt a "probably probable" standard for unconstitutional bias).
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plicity: a judge who presides over a claim by his brother-in-law likely
maintains at least the same level of prejudice as a judge who is in
position to receive a negligible fee for a guilty verdict.10 7 With no
justifiable distinction between the temptation involved in these situa-
tions, the Constitution, they argue, ought to treat them the same. 10 8
To Redish and Marshall, any lesser protections threaten the very foun-
dation of our procedural rights, 10 9 and a wide array of legal organiza-
tions have come forward to support the Caperton petitioners, arguing
this same point.110 Whether to protect "the integrity of the judicial
process,"' I' to publicly "signal" the Court's commitment to the "high-
est ideals of due process," 1 2 or to ensure that our courts do not
become a "pay-to-play environment,"' 13 the general consensus
appears to be that the Supreme Court must announce stricter recusal
standards, beginning first with its decision in Caperton.
With these arguments in mind, the remainder of this Note
assesses the validity of the claim that due process mandates stricter
recusal standards. As it will demonstrate, neither the historical roots
of procedural due process, nor the Supreme Court's developed
understanding of it, supports the notion that due process requires
robust recusal procedures. Rather, the right protects only situations
closely related to the common law standard and certain other
"extreme" cases to prevent manifest injustice. Further, the conse-
quences of this limited recusal right have been largely overblown, and
in light of its practical effects, potential benefits, and implications for
107 See Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 501.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 505.
110 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Ctr. forJustice at NYU School of
Law et al. in Support of Petitioners at 30, Caperton, No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009
WL 45972 [hereinafter Brennan Ctr. Brief] ("Only if this Court reverses [the Caperton
decision] can it put appropriate muscle in the constitutional commitment to judicial
impartiality."); Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 2, Caperton, No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 27299
("[U]nless the Court rules for Petitioners in this case ... there will as a practical
matter be no due process constraints at all."); Brief of the Ctr. for Political Accounta-
bility & the Carol & Lawrence Zicklin Ctr. for Business Ethics Research as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Caperton, No. 08-22 (U.S.Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL
45977 [hereinafter Ctr. for Political Accountability Brief] ("Mandatory recusal is nec-
essary to... maintain the integrity of the judicial system. The economy and the rule
of law cannot thrive without robust safeguards of judicial impartiality.").
111 See Brief of the Am. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3,
Caperton, No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 45978.
112 See Brennan Ctr. Brief, supra note 110, at 29.
113 See Ctr. for Political Accountability Brief, supra note 110, at 15.
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our Constitution's federal structure, such a limited right should not
be a point of concern for the American public.
III. DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: WHAT THE
RIGHT REQUIRES
There is little doubt that the arguments for broad constitutional
recusal standards are facially compelling. The questions these com-
mentators pose are serious, and the answers they offer are initially
attractive. Though natural, these reactions may be misdirected. Due
process is not a matter of simply outcome preferences; the inquiry,
properly framed, is not a question of what is the "fairest" conceivable
situation for an individual litigant. Rather, we must ask what the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments directly require of judges.
That question-what the Due Process Clause requires-is one
that the Supreme Court has consistently struggled with, and it has
given rise to a number of different approaches over time. Indeed, the
plain text of the clause itself is of little help. Ensuring "due process of
law" clarifies the matter about as much as if the Framers had written
that litigants must receive "whatever procedures they must."'1 4 In
fact, several commentators (and judges) have at times contended that
the plain meaning of "due process" affords litigants no more than the
assurance that whatever procedural standards Congress and the courts
have constructed will be followed.1 5 However, such a strictly positivist
interpretation of due process conflicts with long-established Supreme
Court jurisprudence, 16 and this Note operates from the assumption
that the Due Process Clause protects more than just the rule of estab-
lished law. This Part reviews both the historical foundations of due
process and the development of the Supreme Court's procedural due
process jurisprudence. It then examines specifically the Court's
approach to the due process requirements of recusal. Ultimately,
despite certain expansions in the Court's overall approach to due pro-
cess, it remains well established that due process requires very little for
judicial disqualification. Rather, the Constitution provides only a
basic floor to protect litigants from the most extreme and clear-cut
situations of judicial partiality.
114 See Robert P. Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and "7he Substance of Individual
Rights, "58 U. PA. L. REV. 191,204 (1910) ("[R]eading the words in their natural sense,
it seems clear that 'due' process means simply the process which the person involved
is entitled to receive.").
115 See Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 457-58 (noting and rejecting the posi-
tivist view of due process).
116 See supra note 98.
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A. The History of Due Process
The question of what procedures the Due Process Clause requires
is one that defies an easy answer. With little guidance from the plain
text, the historical underpinnings of the Clause prove much more use-
ful in deciphering what the Framers may have intended by it. The key
phrase itself, "due process of law," appeared only once in the English
Statutes of the Realm, in a 1354 statute that on its face is rather similar
to our own Due Process Clause: "' [N]o man ... shall be put out of
land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor
put to death, without being brought in answer by due process of
law." ' 117 Extrapolating from other chapters of the same statute, it
appears clear that this provision ensured simply that parties would not
be summoned before the King without the "usual procedures of the
common law." 118 More precisely, the statute promised service by a
particular writ and the chance to appear before a court to answer,
personally, to one's charges.' 19
In its first extended discussion of the meaning of due process, 120
the Supreme Court expressly embraced a historical interpretative
approach. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,' 2 '
speaking for the Court, Justice Benjamin Curtis traced the roots of
due process to another early English source of law-the Magna
Carta-and to its provision that courts reach decisions "'by the law of
the land."' 22 While noting that several state constitutions expressly
adopted the Magna Carta's language, and that the Due Process Clause
certainly alluded to it, Justice Curtis rejected this singular interpreta-
tion of the Fifth Amendment as too deficient in its ability to restrain
the legislature. 2 3 But the Court did not reject history outright. Quite
to the contrary, Justice Curtis explained that where a procedure does
not violate other specific constitutional provisions, its due process
validity is assessed through examination of "those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statue [sic] law of
117 Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of
Law, 19 AM.J. LEGAL HisT. 265, 266 (1975) (quoting 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354)).
118 Id. at 268.
119 Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONSr.
COMMENT. 339, 340 (1987).
120 Id. at 342-43.
121 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
122 Id. at 276 (quoting MAGNA CARTA cl. 39 (1215)); see also Eberle, supranote 119,
at 343 (noting Justice Curtis' analysis).
123 See Eberle, supra note 119, at 343; see also supra note 98 (noting Justice Curtis'
rejection of positivism).
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England."124 Upon consideration of this historical law (including, yes,
the Magna Carta), Justice Curtis concluded that due process of law
requires, much in line with the 1354 statute, simply "regular allega-
tions, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled
course of judicial proceedings. '" 125 Subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions have been even more explicit in their incorporation of the 1354
expression of due process, explaining that the right affords a party
"notice and opportunity to be heard" when his life, liberty, or prop-
erty are at issue. 126 Today, despite noted changes in the Court's due
process jurisprudence, this historical two-pronged approach remains
essentially intact, and it still provides the due process floor.
127
B. Modern Due Process Analysis
Despite the early reign of historical analysis in its due process
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has long favored less rigid
approaches. 128 Less than thirty years after the Court began its due
process jurisprudence in Murray's Lessee, it changed its course. 129 In
Hurtado v. California,130 the Court shifted from historical analysis to
more broadly assessing due process as a general guarantee of funda-
mental fairness.' 31  Preferring jurisprudential flexibility to the
"unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians,"
the Court in Hurtado rejected Justice Curtis' history-only approach.'
32
Rather, the Court added a consideration of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" to the analy-
124 Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 277.
125 Id. at 280. Justice Curtis also noted that in some instances-such as the trial of
public debtors-due process might not even require this much. See id.
126 The specific formulation of procedural due process as embodying "notice and
opportunity to be heard" appears to have first arisen in Hagar v. Reclamation District
No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884), but subsequent constructions of procedural due
process have widely incorporated some version of this phrase.
127 See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1991) (ScaliaJ.,
concurring) (expounding the history of due process and its "notice" and "opportu-
nity" requirements and explaining that the additional "'settled course ofjudicial pro-
ceedings'" requirement mandates that courts give also the "' process due according to
the laws of the land'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90,
92-93 (1876))).
128 See Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 469 (noting that the " 'frozen-in-his-
tory' approach did not last long").
129 Id.
130 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
131 2 CRAic R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 495-96 (7th ed. 2000).
132 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529.
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sis. I3 3 The transition that Hurtado marked was later solidified in
Twining v. New Jersey.13 4 In Twining, after a thorough historical analy-
sis,13 5 the Court announced, "without repudiating or questioning the
[historical] test proposed by Mr. Justice Curtis," that, despite the evi-
dent historical support for its holding, it preferred to rest its decision
on "broader grounds."'1 36 Once again, the Court justified its decision
through analysis of due process' "fundamental principle[s] of liberty
and justice."137 In other words, by 1908, history was no longer due
process' undisputed trump card. 138
However, the fundamental-concerns model did not last long
either, and current due process jurisprudence proceeds on similarly
flexible, though decidedly different, grounds. Dispensing with nebu-
lous standards like Hurtado's "liberty and justice" formulation, the
Supreme Court now utilizes a "somewhat mechanical" balancing
test.1 39 In Mathews v. Eldridge,140°Justice Lewis Powell ushered in a new
realm of due process jurisprudence, establishing a multifactor balanc-
ing scheme that has become the "cornerstone for all analysis of proce-
dural adequacy.' 41 Noting that due process certainly requires "some
form of hearing,"' 42 Justice Powell determined the "specific dictates"
of that right through consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail.'
43
Notably, the term "fairness" is completely absent from this formula-
tion, and indeed Justice Powell mentions it only three times in the
133 Id. at 535.
134 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
135 See id. at 100-06.
136 Id. at 106.
137 Id.
138 Of course this case leaves open the question ofjust how much of a role history
played in the Court's decision, especially as the Court ultimately ruled in line with
that history.
139 Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 470.
140 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
141 32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 8129, at 82 (3d. ed. 2008).
142 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
143 Id. at 335.
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body of his argument (and once in a footnote) .144 The word "history"
appears only once. 145 Justice Powell therefore departed from both
Justice Curtis' historical tunnel vision and the ill-defined "principle"-
based formulations that succeeded it, choosing instead a due process
analysis couched in mechanistic efficiency. 146 And it is this particular
analysis that has, in large part, taken hold of our due process
jurisprudence.
147
C. Due Process and Judicial Recusal
The preceding due process analysis suggests, it would seem, that
the sufficiency of recusal procedures should be assessed under the
Mathews framework. However, the Supreme Court has never applied
the Mathews test to judicial disqualification. 148 In fact, in Schweiker v.
McClure,149 the Court considered two collateral due process claims-
one involving judicial bias and the other challenging the availability of
administrative review-and disposed of the recusal claim without even
a reference to Mathews, despite relying squarely upon the Mathews test
to assess the latter claim. 150 This is the only Supreme Court decision
reviewing recusal rights that even mentions the Mathews test. In short,
cornerstone or not, the Mathews test has not replaced the traditional
approach to judicial disqualification, and, as Friedland admits,
reformers cannot rely on it for their arguments.
151
Rather, the Court has taken a restrained, ad hoc approach to
assessing due process' requirements for judicial disqualification.
While somewhat unclear, this approach-as earlier described 5 -has
continued to accord certain weight to the limitations of common law
practices. Initially, in Tumey, the Court undertook a plainly historical
approach, directly following the narrow common law standard, and
discussing at length early English laws and cases in support.
15 3 Simi-
larly, one of the Court's most recent decisions to comprehensively
144 See id. at 343, 346 & n.29, 348.
145 See id. at 348.
146 See Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 472.
147 See id.
148 Friedland, supra note 98, at 576 n.48.
149 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
150 See id. at 195-200; Friedland, supra note 98, at 576 n.48.
151 Id. While not express about this point, neither Redish and Marshall nor the
Caperton appellants rely on Mathews for their arguments. However, even relying upon
Mathews, it is not clear that the arguments for reform succeed, which will be
addressed below. See infra text accompanying notes 166-71.
152 See supra Part II.A.
153 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524-26 (1927).
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engage the due process requirements of recusal focused heavily on
common law practice, citing Blackstone' 54 and announcing that a
state's procedural rule "'is not subject to proscription under the Due
Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental. ' " I5 5 There, the Court ruled based upon the common law
standard, and rejected the suggestion that due process was violated by
the presence of mere bias.1
56
Admittedly, history has not been dispositive in the Court's juris-
prudence, and its decisions in Murchison and Ward expanded the
right, developing the interests which require recusal beyond direct
finances. 157 Such decisions decidedly step outside a purely historical
track, but even in these cases, the Court continued to cite and discuss
the historical standard. 158 Moreover, the Court has noted that such
expansions-though at times necessary-are likely rare, reserving
these less-settled recusals for the most clear-cut situations. 159 Indeed,
the Court has presumptively rejected the due process concerns of
many of the most compelling nonhistorical recusal grounds, includ-
ing kinship and personal bias. a60 In sum, though the Court has
strayed from a centrally historical focus, it has consistently highlighted
the traditional limits of recusal's due process implications, 161 and it
continues to afford at least some deference to the history of recusal.
Accordingly, the Court has announced a considerably limited
due process right to recusal, but, more precisely, the Court has taken
154 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986).
155 Id. at 821 (emphasis added) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
201-02 (1977)).
156 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
158 See, e.g., Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1972) (citing the
common law standard relied upon in Tumey and noting "that the mayor there shared
directly in the fees . . . did not define the limits of the principle").
159 See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 821 ("[O]nly in the most extreme of cases would disquali-
fication on this [personal bias] basis be constitutionally required.").
160 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) ("All questions ofjudicial qualifi-
cation may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias,
state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of
legislative discretion.").
161 See, e.g., id.; see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) ("[M]ost ques-
tions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones,
because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitu-
tional floor, not a uniform standard."); Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828 ("The Due Process
Clause demarks only the outer boundaries ofjudicial disqualifications. Congress and
the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial dis-
qualification .... ").
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great care to disavow the Constitution's role in erecting strict recusal
standards. The Court has repeatedly noted that its holdings only con-
strain the due process analysis, leaving federal and state legislatures
free to create more rigorous standards as they see fit. 162 These
explicit invitations to lawmakers suggest precisely why the Court favors
a restrained approach over Mathews. Because setting recusal stan-
dards involves such difficult policy choices, the Court has essentially
(and expressly) called on lawmakers to answer the question. 163 As
expressed by the Court, due process forecloses legislative discretion
beyond only the common law's bright line or in "the most extreme" of
circumstances. 64 It is not that other circumstances may not warrant
recusal, nor that receiving menial payments for convictions is necessa-
rily less fair than presiding over a case involving one's brother-in-law.
Rather, the Court's limited approach simply provides a somewhat reli-
able line for due process' requirements, and extending that line is too
murky a task for any but the most egregious of situations.1 65
Such a limited approach to recusal makes sense if one considers
the alternatives. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine just how a
Mathews test would function. Consider a difficult, though not unu-
sual, circumstance: a judge is slated to hear a case wherein his recent
judicial clerk is counsel for one of the parties. The first factor-the
private interest at stake-is of little use as it would be the same in all
recusal cases: adjudicatory fairness and impartiality are at issue. The
decision is therefore to be made on balance of the remaining two fac-
tors: the judge must apprise the "risk of erroneous deprivation" of
fairness (i.e., the risk that the judge is indeed biased) and weigh it
against the government's interest in the function involved and the
burdens of an alternative procedure (i.e., the benefits of protecting
judicial independence and discretion).1 66 On any wide basis, how
should courts strike this balance? Impartiality is fundamentally an
unapproachable question-a judge is either biased or he is not-that,
162 See, e.g., Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (noting that recusal considerations require
"legislative discretion").
163 See id.
164 Aetna, 475 U.S. at 821.
165 Indeed, if the Caperton oral argument is any indication, the desire to maintain
this bright line continues to play a significant role in the Court's current approach to
recusal standards. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 15-16
(statement of Justice Kennedy) ("[A probability of bias standard] doesn't give suffi-
cient guidance to courts. .. ."); id. at 19 (statement ofJustice Scalia) ("You really have
no test other than probability of bias. We can't-we can't run a system on-on such a
vague standard.").
166 These benefits will be outlined in detail infra Part IV.B.
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in reality, only the individual judge can answer.1 67 Thus, under the
Mathews framework, we simply arrive at the fundamental policy ques-
tion behind all recusal standards: what situations are so clearly unfair
so as to warrant intrusion into judicial independence, sacrificing its
inherent benefits? Indeed, the specific question presented in this
hypothetical is so difficult to assess that even judges on the same cir-
cuit do not agree on how to handle it.168 While judges balance com-
peting claims and answer difficult questions all the time, the Court is
understandably reluctant to announce such complex determinations
through the historically limited mantle of procedural due process. As
for the Hurtado-like fairness assessment that Friedland advocates,1 69
such an approach devolves into essentially the same assessment-only
with even less guidance. Using the same example as above, the ulti-
mate question becomes no easier if it is phrased in terms of protecting
"fundamental fairness." Indeed, as opponents of such an approach
have noted, the Court has never engaged in a "'looks bad' due pro-
cess analysis," and likely for good reason. 170 Moreover, because what,
systemically, best ensures fair and correct decisions is likely an empiri-
cally limited question, it is unclear even what kind of recusal standards
such an approach supports.1 71 Ultimately, more flexible approaches
may not adequately fit the recusal analysis, and the Court has pru-
dently adopted a roughly bright-line approach, leaving more obscure
167 See Symposium, Professional Responsibility: Comments on Recusal, 73 DENV. U. L.
REv. 919, 921 (1996) [hereinafter Professional Responsibility] (statement of Judge
Kelly); see also Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1, 21-24
(2007) (illustrating that strict recusal rules are too imprecise to sort out the often
unapproachable question of actual bias).
168 Compare Professional Responsibility, supra note 167, at 922 (statement of Judge
Ebel) ("If an attorney was formerly my law clerk, I would consider recusal but would
not automatically step down. I would analyze how close a relationship we held and
the number of years that have passed since the clerkship."), with id. at 923 (statement
of Judge Tacha) ("I personally do not sit on former law clerk's cases and think it is
presumptively not a good idea.").
169 See Friedland, supra note 98, at 576 n.48 (arguing that the Mathews test is inap-
propriate for recusal decisions, because it does not properly consider "when it would
be unfair for a particular individual to preside over [a case]").
170 Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 14, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
No. 08-22 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008), 2008 WL 4126332; cf. Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 22, at 11 (statement of Justice Scalia) (rejecting petitioner's contention
that the Court's past holdings require recusal in the face of likely bias). To adopt
such a test may well eliminate the historic distinction between apparent and actual
bias, and is out of line with the Court's recusal holdings. See id. at 29-31; see also
Cravens, supra note 167, at 5-18 (criticizing appearance-based recusal standards as
imprecise and inconsistent).
171 See infra Part IV.B.
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situations to the wisdom of judges and the legislatures that control
them.
IV. DEFENDING THE LIMITS: THE VALUE OF A MODEST RIGHT
The constrained enforcement ofjudicial disqualification as a con-
stitutional matter should not trouble us. At its essence, due process is
not a rigorous procedural guarantee, and the Court's cautious
approach in this regard reserves the difficult question of what recusal
procedures best protect the judiciary, and the public it serves, to the
consideration of Congress and the states. Such an approach is deeply
rooted, long accepted, and indisputably workable. Moreover, the
practical effects of a moderate due process right are rather limited,
and the Court's moderation, in fact, carries particular benefits. A
fuller understanding of the nature of judicial disqualification stan-
dards-and the difficult choices they pose-and consideration of our
Constitution's federal structure counsel that we should, if anything, be
encouraged by a restrained due process right and the freedom it
offers our nation's lawmakers.
A. Practical Effects
As a practical matter, a limited constitutional disqualification
right changes little for U.S. courts and litigants. Foremost, judges well
understand their unique place in our political system and the public's
need for their impartiality-and the recusal problem may therefore
be overstated in general. The ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct declares,
'Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and
avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their
professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times to con-
duct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their inde-
pendence, impartiality, integrity and competence."1 72  As their
comments reveal, judges take this call rather seriously. Speaking on a
panel at the University of Denver Law School, Tenth Circuit Judge
Carlos F. Lucero explained, "I am extremely sensitive to any bias what-
soever, and personally would recuse if there is any reasonable possibil-
ity or suspicion of an appearance of impropriety.' 173 On the same
panel, Judge John J. Porfilio noted that "the party's belief in the fair-
ness of the tribunal . . . is of the utmost importance." 174 Indeed,
172 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2008).
173 Professional Responsibility, supra note 167, at 920 (statement of Judge Lucero).
174 Id. at 921 (statement of Judge Porfilio). During oral argument in Caperton,
Justice Scalia presented a very similar view, stating that people elect judges because
they expect them to be "fair and impartial," and therefore the greatest gratitude a
182 4 [VOL. 84:4
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
judges' concern over their own integrity is so prevalent that, as in
Judge Deanell R. Tacha's experience, "recusal motions are a rare
occurrence" because judges are so quick to recuse themselves in ques-
tionable situations.
1 75
Moreover, in accepting that the Due Process Clause does not
expansively control recusal decisions, we do not have to concede that
no source of law can. Rather, the Court's restraint simply leaves the
thorny (and perhaps unanswerable) question of what comprehensive
recusal requirements best serve the public to those institutions most
capable of engaging the issue: our nation's legislatures. As noted,
nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has enacted positive law
controlling the disqualification of its own judges,176 and insofar as
adjudicatory fairness (both actual and apparent) or the judiciary's
reputation are concerns for us, these sources of law can be utilized to
require whatever rigors we desire forjudicial disqualification. Indeed,
a strong push for enhanced statutory recusal requirements already
exists, 177 and Congress and the states have time and again displayed
their willingness to adapt judicial disqualification standards to prevail-
ing opinions.17 8 Ultimately, recusal standards present a number of
worthy (and competing) policy considerations, and striking the appro-
priate balance is too capricious of a task for the Supreme Court to
undertake on a comprehensive basis. 179 The Court's restraint in this
area does not leave the nation's litigants without their appropriate
protections, nor does it leave judges free from control. Rather, it
merely marks a constitutional floor, placing the far more difficult poli-
cies in the hands of those legislatures directly tasked with assessing
them.
judge can show his supporters is to "be a good judge," be "faithful," and never "lie and
distort cases" to meet his preferences. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at
6 (statement of Justice Scalia).
175 Professional Responsibility, supra note 167, at 923 (statement of Judge Tacha).
176 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
177 See supra Part II.A.
178 As noted supra Part I.B, over the past two centuries, both Congress and the
states have gradually expanded recusal laws in response to changing attitudes about
judicial independence. Today, all U.S. jurisdictions, "with few exceptions," have
imposed explicit judicial disqualification standards more rigorous than those
required by due process. See FLAMM, supra note 29, § 2.5.2, at 34-35. In addition, the
thirty-nine states that elect judges, see Certiorari Petition, supra note 5, at 3, possess
perhaps another check on recusal unease: the threat of losing reelection if a judge
fails to properly recuse himself. Indeed, this check appears to be alive and well in
West Virginia. Only months after the Caperton scandal played out, Chief Justice May-
nard lost his reelection bid. See Liptak, supra note 12.
179 This point will be developed more fully infra Part IV.B.
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B. The Other Side ofJudicial Disqualification
The prudence of leaving the bulk of these recusal decisions to
America's legislators is especially clear upon proper consideration of
the inherent benefits of limited judicial disqualification standards.
Critics of recusal practices have, in large part, portrayed judicial dis-
qualification as a one-sided procedure; arguments for reform treat
recusal decisions as if they are to be based strictly upon whatever
would be the fairest possible situation for the lone party seeking to
remove the judge. However, recusal, properly understood, encom-
passes a difficult balance between allowing judges their due indepen-
dence, and limiting that freedom in order to ensure impartiality.
Ultimately, in only the clearest-or perhaps most "extreme"-of cases
is the need for mandated recusal apparent. The great majority of
potentially biased situations are subject to a number of competing
views. Thus, the bulk of these choices are best made either personally,
by the judge who actually knows whether he is indeed biased, or politi-
cally, by the legislatures directly charged with deciding these complex
policies.
Indeed, judicial disqualification, as it has long been practiced,
does not just objectively preempt the possibility of judicial bias.
Rather, recusal is ultimately a personal, discretionary matter. The very
phrasing of our federal recusal laws supports this notion; despite the
noted substantive expansions in federal disqualification law, most
recusal decisions remain (to the dismay of some' 80 ) within the judge's
discretion: "Any (federal judge] shall disqualify himself in any proceed-
ing in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."''
Until 1974 that decision was not even made objectively,18 2 and today it
remains subject to the historical rule of necessity-permitting even a
financially interested judge to remain on the case if he finds no ade-
quate substitute. 183 At its essence, judicial disqualification remains
often a private matter of professional ethics and prudence.1
8 4
Viewed in this light, in deciding the specific situations in which a
judge must step down, we ought to assess not only the threat that the
judge's participation would pose to instant adjudicatory fairness, but
also the restraints that the standard would place on the judge's inde-
180 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
181 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
182 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 40, at 5.
183 See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980).
184 See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (noting that, beyond legal man-
dates, many recusal questions are left to be answered by "the professional standards of
the bench and bar").
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pendence. This section evaluates the often overlooked value of judi-
cial discretion and independence, and discusses the implications of
considering recusal as a balance between fostering these interests and
preemptively protecting fairness.
1. The Value of Judicial Discretion and Independence
Affording judges freedom to act through their own discretion
carries both systemic and practical benefits. Systemically, the value in
deferring to judges' discretion derives essentially from the need to
protect an independent judiciary. 8 5 Judicial independence is a fun-
damental principle of U.S. law.1 8 6 As the preamble to the ABA's
Model Code of Judicial Conduct declares, an "independent, fair and
impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice."
18 7
Because we do not want our fundamental legal protections to "fall
victim to the passions of the moment," we endow our judges with
some amount of detachment from the rest of our political officers.
18
It is ultimately this detachment which gives judges any reasonable
authority to definitively interpret our laws and Constitution.1 8 9 Judi-
cial independence is in fact a "core concept" of the Constitution itself,
wherein the Framers created a distinctly independent federal judici-
ary, vesting the judicial power in its own branch, giving federal judges
life tenure, and even protecting judicial salaries from congressional
interference. 90
185 Cf Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedu-
ral Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 107, 134 (2004) (describing a
causal chain in which public respect for the judiciary flows, in part, from its
independence).
186 In fact, judicial independence was a fundamental principle of law, long before
U.S. court systems even developed. SeeJack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for
Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1062 (2007).
187 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2008).
188 David Boies, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, 22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y
57, 58 (2006).
189 See id. at 62 ("The genius of the American judicial system's implementation of
the rule of law is that it has coupled the principle of judicial supremacy with the
principle of judicial independence; the latter enables judges to fulfill the function
that the former gives them.").
190 Rakove, supra note 186, at 1062; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both
of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office."). As U.S. District Court Judge
Julie Robinson explains, these provisions demonstrate that "the founders, in their
considered and educated judgment, determined that on the balance, the need for a
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In order to uphold judges' independence, we therefore imbue
the judiciary with at least a certain level of respect and deference.
Judges are, of course, simply people-with their own experiences,
opinions, and presumptions-and yet we expect them to decide cases
objectively and fairly out of a commitment to their oaths.191 As Black-
stone described, judicial authority "greatly depends upon [the pub-
lic's] presumption" that, on power of their oaths, judges will
"administer impartial justice."'192 It is hard to imagine how an effec-
tive judiciary could work any other way; to the extent that judges are
to be the ultimate arbiters of law, they must receive some amount of
deference to their ability to carry out that task. If judges do not have
the freedom to adjudicate cases through their wisdom and according
to their oaths, judicial functioning will devolve into to an outcome-ori-
ented affair, rather than a decisionmaking process, ultimately sacrific-
ing the rule of law.193 Allowing recusal decisions to be made by
outsiders may in fact give judicial critics "a veto over participation of
any Justices who had social contacts with . . . a named official."'
1 94
That situation gives litigants, court observers, or even partisan journal-
ists incentives to actively search for reasons to question a judge's
impartiality-a result that is "intolerable." 195 Ultimately, much like
the goal of mandated recusal, promoting judicial independence is
largely to help ensure, at least on a system-wide level, the judiciary's
decisional impartiality.
19 6
Beyond (or perhaps below) the systemic values of an indepen-
dent judiciary, deference to judicial discretion affords courts, and the
public as a whole, a number of practical benefits. Foremost, leaving
recusal decisions to the prudence of individual judges helps avoid the
sort of 'judicial forum shopping" that rigorous recusal standards
would inevitably encourage.' 97 If recusal were widely mandated, savvy
judiciary free of political or undue influence necessitated a judiciary that could
render decisions without allegiance to the popular opinions or the most vocal propo-
nents in the community." Julie A. Robinson, Judicial Independence: The Need for Educa-
tion About the Role of the Judiciary, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 540 (2007).
191 See Robinson, supra note 190, at 539.
192 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *361 (emphasis added).
193 Robinson, supra note 190, at 544.
194 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 927 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.)
(explaining his decision to not recuse himself from the case).
195 Id.; see also Cravens, supra note 167, at 18-21 (describing the danger in over-
valuing the public's perception of the judiciary at the expense of judicial integrity).
196 See Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 CEo. L.J.
929, 931 (2007).
197 See Todd Lochner, Judicial Recusal and the Search for the Bright Line, 26 JusT. Sys.
J. 231, 231-32 (2005).
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litigants would presumably attempt to systematically remove certain
judges until they were left with one of their liking.1 98 In this regard,
strict recusal standards may in fact prevent the best judge from hearing
the case. 199 Further, robust disqualification standards would present a
great burden to court resources and adjudicative efficiency. The
more easily available recusal is, the more litigants will seek disqualifi-
cation, thus straining court resources by forcing judges to be fre-
quently shuffled around, and giving rise to an expanse of motions and
appeals to be adjudicated. 200 Recusal imposes even heavier burdens
on courts in especially complex litigation, wherein it will take the reas-
signed judge a great deal of time and effort to sift through the large
case files or to get up to speed on intricate scientific evidence. 20 1 In
such a case, the parties most affected by the judge's recusal decision-
the actual litigants in the case-might well benefit from more judicial
freedom to remain on the case, as the "fiscal burdens [of recusal] on
litigants are formidable." 20 2 This raises its own fairness concern:
because such recusals are so expensive, stricter disqualification stan-
dards might disproportionately benefit the wealthiest parties. 20 3
Finally, at the supreme court level (in both state and federal systems),
recusal may simply prevent cases from being heard if disqualification
leaves too few justices to constitute a quorum.20 4
198 An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of seven states in support of the Massey
Energy in Caperton warns that such practice would result inevitably in "en masse" over-
recusal of judges. See Brief of the State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Feb. 4, 2009),
2009 WL 298466 [hereinafter States' Brief].
199 See Professional Responsibility, supra note 167, at 921 (statement of Judge Kelly).
200 See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1081-82 (1996).
201 See Panel Discussion, Disqualification ofJudges (the Sarokin Matter): Is It a Threat to




204 See Lewis, supra note 37, at 385. In the federal system, if the Supreme Court
cannot constitute the required six-Justice quorum, it may transfer a case brought by
direct appeal from a district court to the relevant circuit court (which happened
famously in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)) or
must otherwise affirm the lower courtjudgment. See generally Stempel, supra note 26,
at 647-51 (discussing the Supreme Court practice and cases where it lacked a
quorum).
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2. Searching for a Balance
The benefits of judicial independence and adjudicatory discre-
tion demonstrate that the most rigorous recusal practices may not
necessarily be the most desirable. However, judicial independence
does not require complete freedom from external control, and judi-
cial discretion must itself operate within the constraints imposed by
disqualification standards. Setting recusal procedures is therefore a
complex balancing exercise that assesses where the proper median
between these two fundamental concerns should lie. The sheer diffi-
culty of assessing that balance suggests that we should avoid readily
erecting rigorous prophylactics againstjudicial bias, at the cost ofjudi-
cial independence.
Indeed, just as our Constitution expresses certain answers to this
question for the federal courts, lawmakers in every other U.S. jurisdic-
tion have assessed, in their own judgment, this balance, and states
have constructed a variety of systems to appoint and regulate their
judicial officers. In structuring its own judiciary, each state necessarily
chooses how and to what extent it will promote judicial indepen-
dence. The diverging approaches that states have taken show that
there are no clear or correct answers to be had.20 5 Yes, certain bright
lines seem warranted-for instance, that it cannot conceivably be fair
to pay a judge to rule a certain way, despite whatever advantages it
may offer-but it is largely too difficult to assert when, universally,
judicial constraint must trump competing values. Indeed, the proper
balance between judicial legitimacy and case-by-case impartiality is
likely empirically unverifiable, and perhaps never can be settled. We
should therefore refrain from too quickly espousing constitutional
"answers" to these problems, and we ought to avoid erecting barriers
to a fuller consideration of the complexities at hand.20 6 For this very
reason, the Supreme Court has taken a restrained approach in apply-
ing due process to recusal procedures, and its cautious jurisprudence
should not offend our sensibilities.
205 See generally Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selec-
tion Process in the United States, 75 MICH. B.J. 904 (1996) (describing and comparing
four basic approaches-each with its own variants-to the selection and qualification
of state judges); see also States' Brief, supra note 198, at 19-21 (describing the "down-
right kaleidoscopic" diversity in state judicial selection procedures).
206 The seven-states amicus brief filed in support of Massey emphasizes this partic-
ular point, and argues that such "constitutionaliz[ing]" of state recusal practice is
both needless and contrary to states' "vigorous and innovative" regulation of their




Finally, the very structure of our constitutional government sug-
gests that a restrained approach to recusal is an appropriate one. The
creation of robust due process recusal rights would in essence compel
all courts, in all states, to abandon their established practices and to
adopt specific answers to what has been shown to be a rather complex
policy decision. Such a proposal therefore carries disconcerting
implications for our federal system.
"As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system
of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment. '20 7 This proposition is neither controversial nor without force,
and it has been extended to prevent federal commandeering of both
state legislatures and executive officials.208 While these prohibitions
do not prevent the federal government from "commandeering" state
courts by requiring them to hear certain cases in order to uphold fed-
eral law,209 recusal duties present far different commands to judges
than do rules obligating jurisdiction. Namely, imposing a duty to
recuse does nothing to buttress substantive federal law. Judicial dis-
qualification, as a general matter, is not "part and parcel" of any fed-
eral claim, it does not specially "burden a federal right," nor are there
any other indications to suggest that it should be treated as fundamen-
tally "substantive" in nature. 210 To the contrary, like other aspects of
judicial process, recusal decisions are very much within the realm of
states' "sovereignty over procedure."211 Indeed, recusal choices
merely reflect a judge's-and by extension a state's-own determina-
tion that he is adequately qualified to preside over a case. Though the
Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the matter, it is likely that
such assessments of state officials are squarely within the states'
unique authority.212 For the federal government to step in and pre-
cisely mandate when state judicial actors are and are not qualified to
207 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
208 See AnthonyJ. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J.
947, 949-50 (2001).
209 See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State
Courts: Implications for the Theory ofJudicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 71, 75-76 (1998).
210 See Bellia, supra note 208, at 983-85.
211 See id. at 981 (noting that the Supreme Court has implied that "federal and
state governments are sovereign over how their respective laws shall be enforced").
212 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (noting that congressional interference with Mis-
souri's state judge qualifications would "upset the usual constitutional balance of fed-
eral and state powers").
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hear a case involving any law is to thereby cross the very boundary of
sovereignty that federalism is to protect.
213
On this view, the restrained pronouncement of constitutional
judicial disqualification standards appropriately respects the limits
that federalism might place on recusal. Indeed, such an approach
aligns well with certain federalism-inspired doctrines that the Court
already practices, such as the presumption requiring a clear congres-
sional statement for the preemption of state laws. 2 14 Moreover, the
Supreme Court itself has suggested that federalism concerns might
limit the federal government's power to control state judges.215 In
considering the constitutionality of a congressional statute that pur-
ported to invalidate certain state-imposed age qualifications for Mis-
souri judges, the Court announced (while avoiding an ultimate
answer): "Congressional interference with this decision of the people
of Missouri, defining their constitutional officers, would upset the
usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers. For this rea-
son, 'it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Con-
gress' intent before finding that federal law overrides' this balance.
'216
Recusal choices-which essentially designate situations in which a
judge is not competent to hear a case-encompass just those "defin-
ing" features of "constitutional officers" that are left to the states'
appraisal. A limited right refrains from comprehensively binding
states to one national answer for these assessments, ultimately helping
to preserve our federal balance of power.
As it is, the limited recusal jurisprudence that we have carries cer-
tain consequences for federalism. Because the Supreme Court views
213 Of course, broader due process requirements would not "commandeer" state
judges through a regulatory act of Congress, but rather they rest upon an individual
constitutional right, making the case for them arguably more compelling. The Four-
teenth Amendment did, after all, alter our federal balance of powers at least to some
extent. In this regard, there is no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment carries the
power to compel state courts to follow certain procedures. However, to do so, the
procedures it mandates must come directly from those required by its Due Process
Clause. The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment did not simply eviscerate all rem-
nants of federalism, leaving states-and their courts-at the mercy of the federal gov-
ernment. See Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism,
Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2300 (1999) (reviewing
AKHIL REED AmAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998)). Rather, that Amendment, like all
amendments, is but a part of a larger constitutional scheme that incorporates, at its
base, certain structural features, such as federalism and separation of powers, and it is
through this light that it should be interpreted. See id.
214 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
215 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
216 Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
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(correctly) federal recusal law as imposing stricter standards than due
process mandates, its recusal holdings typically compel state judges to
step down. Broad expansion of those holdings therefore does not
promote greater due process rights for our nation's litigants, but
more precisely, it compels state court systems to adhere to the prac-
tices that Congress has deemed proper for federaljudges. Such a pro-
posal contradicts the understanding that states alone are charged with
the duty to "defin[e] their constitutional officers"217 or that "[t]he
powers reserved to the several States . . . extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order . . . of the
State."2 18 And yet this infringement is precisely what scholars such as
Friedland, and especially Professors Redish and Marshall, propose.
Redish and Marshall suggest that a heavy presumption should in fact
lie on the opposite side of mandated recusal. They argue: "Only when
it is all but impossible to rectify bias should a potential lack of inde-
pendence be tolerated. '219 This severe burden on judges to prove
themselves not biased in unclear situations in no way aligns with our
longstanding presumption that ajudge is "already sworn to administer
impartial justice,"220 and as this section has sought to demonstrate,
such a proposal should caution us from too quickly accepting argu-
ments for expansive due process recusal requirements. 221
CONCLUSION
What, then, are critics to make of our limited due process right to
judicial disqualification? Frankly, not much. That our Federal Consti-
tution does not provide definitive answers to some of the most diffi-
cult recusal questions does not mean that U.S. law cannot. Indeed,
the Constitution's silence need not quiet our legislative concern. If
anything, the recognition of due process' proper limits simply allows
critics to more usefully direct their recusal complaints to the bodies
that have proven their ability and willingness to act upon them-fed-
eral and state legislatures. Due process, in essence, protects only cases
217 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
218 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
219 Redish & Marshall, supra note 94, at 504.
220 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *361.
221 In fact, to several states, the federalism implications of strict recusal standards
are so great that they caution against even extension of the traditional pecuniary
interest standard to the situation of judicial campaign finance. See generally States'
Brief, supra note 198, at 7-9 (arguing against reversal in Caperton, because such a
ruling would too greatly extend due process' reach, contravening principles of
federalism).
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of clear or extreme unfairness, and a limited approach ensures that it
will do specifically that. The rest-with factual vagaries that neither
Justices Black and Jackson nor Judges Ebel and Tacha can agree
upon-is simply for our political bodies to decide.
Moreover, the Caperton appeal stands as an example of just how
our system works. To be certain, the Caperton saga is ugly and troub-
ling, but, most important, it is one that the Supreme Court has chosen
to review. Indeed, the Caperton scenario is precisely the type that a
restrained due process approach singles out. A strong argument can
be made that $3 million in campaign money-for a judge who relies
on elections for his livelihood-constitutes a "direct pecuniary inter-
est" in the matter. Moreover, the Caperton case likely presents an
"extreme" enough situation to warrant due process protections,
regardless. 222 In this sense, the Caperton appellants and reformers
such as Redish and Marshall may well have overplayed their hand. In
order to protect litigants in these situations, we do not need to
announce a sweeping due process right.223 Conversely, a restrained
due process right addresses precisely these situations, and if the Court
decides-as it perhaps ought to-that due process was violated in
Caperton, court observers should not infer much beyond this point.
But no matter the eventual outcome of Caperton, the Court's
review of the case is only one in a host of potential protections. For-
mer Chief Justice Maynard has already lost his seat on the West Vir-
ginia court, and if public commentators have their way, Justice
Benjamin won't be far behind. The West Virginia legislature is cur-
rently considering judicial reform to address this very matter, and
West Virginia has its own recusal statute, which its lawmakers are free
to amend as they see fit. At the end of the day, the Court's holding-
and whatever limitations the Justices place on it-will not constrain
the protections that states may offer their litigants. To be certain, no
system is perfect and not all decisions will be free of bias. However,
the limits of due process need not affect our own pursuit of those
goals, which the American public would do well to keep in mind as it
watches Caperton play out, and as it reacts to whatever scandal inevita-
bly arises next.
222 Indeed, such a suggestion was briefly made by Justice Stevens at the Caperton
argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 29-30 (characterizing
the Caperton case as the most "extreme" recusal case that the Court has yet
confronted).
223 And,judging by the statements of some of the Justices in oral argument, if the
Caperton petitioners lose their appeal, it might be directly because they hung their
case on such an unrestrained due process formulation. See, e.g., supra note 165
(describing the Justices' concern over the applicability of a "probable bias" standard).
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